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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this reason is to examine the cash holding policies of U.S. casino firms.  More 
specifically, we attempt to understand why casinos hold the amounts of cash that they do and what the 
implications of these policies are.  Our results support the notion that risky dividend-paying firms hold 
more cash.  However, we find that there is no relationship between risk and cash holdings for all firms.  
Furthermore, we find that casino firms that use more debt tend to hold more cash.  This is the opposite 
finding in the literature and is worthy of further investigation. 
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Purpose and introduction 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate cash holding policies of U.S. casino firms.  Specifically, 
we hope to develop a better understanding why casino firm managers hold the amounts of cash they do and 
what implications this may have for the position of the firm.  Cash is a critical asset to the success of any 
firm.  As discussed by Schmidgall and Damitio (2006), cash is used to pay for wages, goods, interest 
payments and potentially dividends.  In the case of hotel and restaurant acquisitions, cash has been a 
predominant financing tool (Oak, Andrew and Bryant, 2008).  Casino firms not only need cash like other 
firms, but they generate tremendous amounts of cash.  As an example, MGM Mirage generated cash flow 
from continued operations of more than $1.25 billion in 2007 (the Street.com, 2010).The casino segment 
has mucha higher liquidity ratio than other hospitality sectors (Kim and Ayoun, 2005; Ryu and Jang 2004). 
Thus, this evidence demonstrates the importance of cash to the casino industry.  Furthermore, we believe 
this is the first research into the topic of cash holding policy in the casino industry. 
 
We begin with a simple definition of “cash”.  While some consider only the currency itself, most 
published research such as work by Mikkelson and Partch (2003) consider cash to actually mean cash and 
its equivalents.  Thus, “cash” actually includes all liquid instruments that are readily convertible into cash.  
This would include readily marketable securities such as stocks and short-term bonds. When firms have 
sufficient other liquid assets besides cash, they do not need to raise funds because of the low cost of 
converting non-cash liquid assets into cash (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).According to Harford (1999), the top 
25 percent of U.S. nonfinancial corporations held eight percent of their assets in cash and short-term 
investments on average.  Also cash equaled about 20 percent of the equity value of largefirms such as IBM 
and Chrysler in 1995.Hulbert (2006) reports that most publicly-traded American firms have enough cash to 
pay off their debt and still have cash to spare. 
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While we will provide further illumination into the theoretical bases for cash holding policies of 
firms in the literature review, we will provide some basic motivational information here first.  In terms of 
cash holdings, management faces an important dilemma.  As previously discussed, management needs to 
maintain an adequate cash balance in order to properly manage day-to-day operations of the firm.  
However, as discussed by Luo and Hachiya (2005), the investment returns on maintaining such excess 
liquidity are usually much less than other investments.  Additionally, as discussed by Jensen (1986), 
holding too much cash may cause agency problems between management and shareholders and lead to 
“empire building” by management. 
 
On the other hand, cash on hand can be used to effectively take advantage of potentially valuable 
investment opportunities (Mikelson and Partch, 2003).  The advantage relates to internal funds being first 
in the preferred pecking order of funding and avoiding potential agency problems with bondholders 
(Myers, 1977). It also helps avoid the costly process of raising new outside equity and the associated 
potential agency problems (Myers and Majiluf, 1984). 
 
The debate about whether or not maintaining cash reserves increases shareholder value remains 
unanswered.  Harford, Mandi and Maxwell (2008) show that weakly controlled managers choose to spend 
cash quickly on acquisitions, although there is only limited evidence regarding the effects of this spending 
on firm profitability. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) show that firms with high cash 
holdings tend to take actions that are consistent with enhancing shareholder value.  On the other hand, 
research by Harford (1999) shows that managers with weaker incentives will make poorer investment 
choices with their cash holdings. 
 
This paper is organized in the following manner.  The next section will discuss the pertinent 
literature.  The third section will provide the hypotheses to be tested, the data used and the methodology 
employed.  This will be followed by the results of the analysis.  The paper will provide conclusions and 
recommendations for additional research in the final section. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The potential motivations for choosing a particular cash holdings policy can be delineated into two 
main categories as done by Mikkelson and Partch (2003):  managerial self-interest and agency problems 
associated with outside financing.  Managers typically have a vested interest in not only the maintenance of 
their positions within the firm, but also the firm itself.  However, large cash holdings may lead to 
underinvestment in value-increasing in favor of managerial perquisites, or overinvestment in value-
reducing projects (Jensen, 1986).  Evidence of this is shown in research by Blanchard, Lopex-de-Silanes 
and Schleifer (1994).  They find that firms who have sudden influxes of large cash from a won or settled 
lawsuit tend to invest in lower-value investment opportunities.   Agency problems of free cash flow are 
likely to develop in large and more established firms and result in an increase of cash holdings (Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz, 2009).  Moreover, as discussed by Mikkelson and Partch (2003), excess “financial slack” 
provides an opportunity to escape the scrutiny or discipline of outside financing.  Similarly, Harford, Mansi 
and Maxwell (2008) find that weakly-controlled managers are more apt to spend cash more freely on 
capital expenditures.  
 
Moreover, part of managerial self-interest involves survivability of the firm as discussed by Opler, et. 
al (1999).  They find that “riskier” firms (those with greater variability in their cash flows) tend to hold a 
higher proportion of liquid assets.  A similar finding is shown by Luo and Hachiya(2005) who find a 
significantly positive relationship between sales volatility and cash holdings for a sample of Japanese firms.  
In terms of risk in the hospitality industry, the casino industry tends to have greater systematic risk (Gu& 
Ku, 1997).  The authors also propose that because casinos are also in the entertainment business their 
2
International CHRIE Conference-Refereed Track, Event 1 [2011]
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/refereed/ICHRIE_2011/Thursday/1
3 
 
revenue stream is more volatile than the hotel industry.  Moreover, research indicates that the casino 
industry has high liquidity (Kim &Ayoun, 2005; Ryu& Jang, 2004). On the other hand, Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003) look at changes in sales and variation in operating income relative to cash holdings.  They 
find negative relationships, albeit non-significant. This may be from differences in the time period 
examined.  Opler, et al. (1999) use the 1971-1994 period and Luo and Hachiya (2005) use the 1989-2002 
period for their study.  Mikkelson and Parch (2003) use the 1986-1991 periodwhich includesa recession in 
the middle of their sample. 
 
Financing is tied together with the cash holding policy.  The “pecking order” theory of financing was 
first proposed by Myers (1977)and was later advanced by Myers and Majiluf (1984).  When firms are 
looking for financing for future growth, they have a number of options.  One would be to pursue new 
outside equity.  However, given agency costs of effective monitoring and information asymmetry, raising 
new equity is costly and lengthy.  A more favored source of capital would be debt, typically either in the 
form of a loan or bonds.  However, there are agency costs associated with the issuance of debt as well in 
order to reduce information asymmetry for potential lenders.  Overall, the idea that procurement of outside 
capital is costly has been documented by Smith (1977) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986).  In the case study 
by Gu and Ku (1997), the project financing decision made by Circus Circus and the Mirage showed that 
internal funds were favored the most, followed by other types of secured (mortgages) and unsecured 
debentures. 
 
Although the issuance of debt isgenerally faster and less costly, one of the potential problems that 
can arise is the underinvestment problem as discussed by Myers (1977).  For example, management may 
have an opportunity to invest in a project.  The project generates a safe, steady cash flow without providing 
an excess return to shareholders.  This type of project will make bondholders happy, but not the 
shareholders.  Therefore, although management may have enough funds to complete the project, they will 
pass on it because it favors bondholders more than shareholders.  Hence, the firm experiences an 
“underinvestment” of funds.  Another potential problem is that principal and interest payments for the debt 
constrain management’s ability to take advantage of potential investment opportunities for future growth.  
This will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Finally, there is the preferred form of capital (if available), internally generated funds.  This was 
previously mentioned in the case study of Circus Circus and the Mirage (Gu and Ku, 1997). Using internal 
funds is preferred by management because the payment of dividends (from outside equity sources) and 
interest (paid to outside debt sources) involve scrutiny from the capital markets.  If these funds are readily 
available, they can help management take advantage of positive NPV growth opportunities at a lower cost 
than that of new external equity (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2008).  
 
Thus, this theoretical underpinning would lead to the expectation that firms with significant cash 
holdings would need less financial leverage.  In addition, if interest payments from debt are a constraint, 
firms would try to reduce leverage (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009).  Opler, et. al. (1999) regress total firm 
leverage on the log of the ratio of cash to assets and find a significantly negative relationship between the 
two.  This is also supported by the findings of Luo and Hachiya (2005) who find a negative relationship 
between total leverage (total debt/assets) and cash holdings.  Furthermore,Mikkelson and Partch(2003) look 
at the median long-term debt to asset ratios of large cash holding firms and other firms.  They find that cash 
holding firms have lower long-term debt than regular firms. 
 
Firm size may also play a role in cash holding policy.  However, the evidence regarding the 
relationship is indeterminate.  On the one hand, an early study by Vogel and Maddala (1967) shows large 
firms tend to have lower cash-to-asset ratios.  Opler, et. al  (1999) argue that management realizes the 
opportunity cost of holding excess cash.  Therefore, large firms would hold less cash.  They run a 
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regression for firms from 1972 and 1994 and find a significantly negative relationship between firm size 
and cash holdings.  This negative relationship is also found for firms from 1986-1991 by Mikkelson and 
Partch (2003). In terms of casino firms, there may be a negative relationship because larger casino firms 
tend to be more financially stable and could be more resistant to economic downturns because larger 
casinos provide diverse services to their patrons (Greenlees,2008)   Smaller firms may have to hold 
largeramounts of cash because they tend to have higher costs related to the acquisition of fundson short 
notice (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, large firms are usually successful.  This may mean that they have been able to 
accumulate more cash over time.  As argued by Myers and Majiluf (1984) using internal funds is a cost 
saving maneuver because the funds are cheaper than outside funding.  Froot (1993) studies Intel 
Corporation and argues that firm with large cash reserves can deter competition.  This is because they have 
a greater ability to take advantge of new investment opportunities or make acquisitions.  Large firms may 
have managers who retain cash to engage in some form of “empire building” as suggested by Jensen 
(1986).  Also, as argued by Opler, et. al. (1999) firm size is a takeover deterrent.  Larger firms with more 
cash are able to engage in political activity (i.e. spend more of political contributions or lobbying efforts) to 
force potential bidders to use more resources.  Luo and Hachiya (2005) find a significantly positive 
relationship between firm size and cash holdings for firms in Japan from 1989 to 2001.Brealey, et al. 
(2008) report that firms in certain industries such as biotech firms have a large reservoir of cash holdings 
for their future investment needs. In addition,large cash holdings may help firms to insulate themselves 
during economic downturns.   
 
The growth opportunity prospects for the firm are related to the pecking order of financing proposed 
by Myers (1977). The use of internal funds (if available) is the easiest and cheapest.  Furthermore, as 
argued by Opler, et. al. (1999), the availability of these funds helps management avoid the scrutiny of the 
capital markets.  If the firm has significant growth opportunities, management will want to hold cash to be 
able to take advantage of them. 
 
The empirical evidence between growth opportunities and cash holdings is very consistent.  
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) look at the medians of firms that hold significant amounts of cash and those 
that don’t.  They find a much higher market-to-book ratio (of assets) for cash holding firms.  Using a 
regression analysis, they find a significantly positive relationship between cash holdings and the market-to-
book ratio.  This finding is consistent with Opler, et. al. (1999), Harford (1999), and Kim, Mauer and 
Sherman (1998).Luo and Hachiya (2005) use a one-year growth rate in sales as a proxy for growth 
opportunities in their study of Japanese firms.  They also find a significant and positive relationship 
between cash holdings and growth opportunities. 
 
Hypotheses, Data and Methodology 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the cash holding policy of U.S. casino firms.  Specifically, 
we intend to test the following two research hypotheses: 
HA1:  There is a positive relationship between cash holdings and firm risk (variability of cash flow). 
HA2:  There is a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage. 
  
 Our data is from the Compustat annual industrial files with the SIC code 7990 (casino industry) 
for cash holdings and their determinants from 1990-2007.  Our sample included a total of 155 firms. 
 
Our full model is based on modified methodologies from Mikkelson and Partch (2003) and Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009). We employ anOLS regression model using the sample of cash holdingsand their 
determinants.  Predicted signs for variables are in Table 1. 
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Table 1.Predicted signs of regression coefficients. 
 
Dependent variable = cash holdings  
Independent variables Predicted sign 
LEV - 
RISK + 
M/B + 
SIZE +/- 
EQUITY-ISS + 
DEBT-ISS + 
CAPEX - 
ACQ - 
DIV - 
 
Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash equivalents to book assets.  LEV is the leverage variable as 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total book assets. RISK is the absolute change in earnings before 
interest, taxes and depreciation.  M/B is the market to book ratio, as defined by Opler, et. al (1999).  This 
ratio is calculated as the book value of assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market value of 
equity, divided by book assets.  SIZE is the natural log of total book assets.  EQUITY-ISS  is net equity 
issuance which is equity sale minus equity purchases, divided by book assets.  DEBT-ISS is the net debt 
issuance which is long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt retirement divided by book assets.  
CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets.  ACQ is cash outflow due to 
the acquisition divided by total book assets.  DIV is the amount of common dividends paid. 
 
The following regression model will be used to test the previously stated hypotheses (see table 1 for 
the descriptions of variables): 
 
Cash Holdings = β0 + β1 LEV + β2 RISK + β3 M/B + β4 SIZE + β5 EQUITYISS  +β6DEBTISS+   
β7CAPEX + β8 ACQ+  β9 DIV + εi 
 
The dependent variable in the model is Cash holdings, which is the cash equivalents to assets ratio.  
“Cash equivalents” includes cash and marketable securities.The primary variables of interest are leverage, 
risk, and the market to book ratio.  The leverage ratio ismeasured by the ratio of total debt to total assets.  
Firms with low leverage ratios are likely to have high cash holdings.Risk is the absolute change in 
EBITDA from 1990 to 2007.  Firms with high earnings are likely to have high cash holdings, similar to the 
findings of Luo and Hachiya (2005).  The growth opportunity variable is measured by the ratio of market 
value to book value. We expect firms with high growth opportunities to have higher cash holdings. 
 
We have also inserted control variables into the regression model to help delineate the effects of the 
variables of interest.  In regards to the uses of cash, we divide them into cash outflows and cash inflows.  
The three categories of cash outflows are capital expenditures, acquisitions and dividends.  The two 
categories of (potential) cash inflows through financing activities are net equity issuance and net debt 
issuance.  According to Mikkelson and Partch (2003), the median ratio of all investment expenditures to 
operating assets for high cash firms is higher than the median of comparison firms.  On the other hand, 
recent empirical studies show a negative relationship between the average cash ratio and acquisitions, 
capital expendituresand dividend payments (Bates, Kahle&Stulz, 2009).  As S&P 500 companies’ 
aggregate cash balance has increased in the 2000s, dividend payouts and mergers are also on the rise 
(Cheng, 2010).  
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Since it takes cash to make capital expenditures, we expect firms with high cash holdings to make 
fewer capital expenditures.   Similarly, firms that make more acquisitions have lower cash holdings.  These 
expectations are consistent with Riddick and Whited (2009) who find that cash flow and saving move in 
opposite directions (in other words, they invest).  In terms of dividends, firms that pay dividends tend to be 
less risky and are scrutinized by the capital markets.  Therefore, “empire building” would be less likely and 
firms that pay dividends will have lower cash holdings.  
 
We follow Bates et al. (2009) for controllingfor cash inflows through financing activities.  They 
control for equity and debt issues surrounding an initial public offering.  While cash holdings increase after 
raising capital, cash holdings decrease after the raised capital has been spent.  We use net amounts for 
financing through both debt and equity issues. 
 
Discussion of Results 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the entire sample (see Table 1 for the descriptions of 
variables).  The total number of observations for the full sample is 952; the mean cash holdings to assets 
ratio is approximately 12 percent. 
 
There are a number of significant Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables, particularly 
with leverage and size.  It is important to recognize the potential for multicollinearity within the regression 
models and this issue will be discussed later in the results. 
 
Table 3 shows the results for the regression model using the full sample.  When we first ran the 
regression model, we discovered serial correlation within the model, as we suspected.  The Durbin-Watson 
statistic was approximately 1.0, indicating serious serial correlation.  To correct this problem, we followed 
the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure as described by Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1989). 
 
The process begins by saving the residuals from the full regression model.  We then ran the 
autocorrelation function (ACF) in Minitab to determine if any lags in the dependent variable are significant.  
We found that the lag of one period was significant with a ρ of .46.  Once this amount has been obtained, 
we transform both dependent and independent variables in the following manner: 


 = - ρ and  = - ρ 
 
Thus, the new dependent variable becomes the difference between the dependent variable at time t 
and the lagged dependent variable that has been multiplied by ρ.  We applied the same transformation for 
all of the independent variables.  It should be noted that since we are using a difference with a transformed 
variable and not merely a lagged dependent variable the Durbin-Watson statistic is still a valid indicator of 
potential serial correlation. 
 
We use the Best Subsets algorithm in Minitab to find the best univariate and multivariate models.  
The Best Subsets algorithm makes use of the Cp criterion, which involves the total mean squared error.  
We sought out the models with the lowest Cp statistic.  As shown in Table 3, the Durbin-Watson statistic 
for all models ranges from 1.95 to 2.01, indicating the absence of serial correlation in the models.  We also 
checked the variance inflation factors (VIF) for multicollinearity.  The VIF for the models ranged from 
1.01 to 2.07, indicating a lack of multicollinearity.  F-statistics for all the models are significant at 1 percent 
level.    
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Table 2.Descriptive statistics for the entire sample. 
 
Variable N Mean Std 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum 
Cash 
Holdings 
952 0.1217 0.1429 0.000 0.9799 
LEV 952 1.553 9.699 0.027 195.333 
RISK 952 1.629 11.045 0.0 306.250 
M/B 952 14.44 229.0 0.20 6255.81 
SIZE 952 4.8176 2.3975 -5.8091 10.059 
EQUITY-
ISS 
952 0.1491 1.0935 -2.9499 26.0833 
DEBT-ISS 952 0.0556 0.361 -2.030 5.814 
CAPEX 952 0.0919 0.1149 -0.007 1.442 
ACQ 952 0.0185 0.0719 -0.204 0.789 
DIV 952 8.03 49.13 0.000 796.90 
 
 
Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash equivalents to book assets.  LEV is the leverage variable as measured by the ratio of total debt to 
total book assets.  RISK is the absolute change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation.  M/B is the market to book ratio, as 
defined by Opler, et. al (1999).  This ratio is calculated as the book value of assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity, divided by book assets.  SIZE is the natural log of total book assets.  EQUITY-ISS is net equity issuance which is 
equity sale minus equity purchases, divided by book assets.  DEBT-ISS is the net debt issuance which is long-term debt issuance 
minus long-term debt retirement divided by book assets.  CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets.  
ACQ is cash outflow due to the acquisition divided by total book assets.  DIV is the amount of common dividends paid. 
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Table 3.  Regression analysis results for full sample. 
 
 
Dependent 
variable = cash 
holdings 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Model 5 
 
 
Model 6 
 
 
Model 7 
 
 
Model 8 
 
 
Model 9 
Intercept .118*** .105*** .108*** .109*** .109*** .109*** .108*** .109*** .109*** 
LEV --- .002** .002** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** 
RISK -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000 
M/B -- -- -- -- -- -.000 -.000 -.000 -.000 
SIZE -.021*** -.016*** -.016*** -.016*** -.015*** -.016*** -.015*** -.015*** -.015*** 
EQUITY-ISS -- -- -- -- -- -- .006 .005 .006 
DEBT-ISS -- -- -- .033*** .037*** .036*** .038*** .038*** .038*** 
CAPEX -- -- -.092*** -.103*** -.109*** -.108*** -.114*** -.114*** -.114*** 
ACQ -- -- -- -- -.114** -.112** -.119** -.118** -.118** 
DIV -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .000 .000 
F Statistics 73.2*** 56.1*** 40.2*** 32.7*** 27.4*** 22.9*** 19.9*** 17.6*** 15.5*** 
Adjusted R-square 7.1% 10.4% 11.0% 11.8% 12.2% 12.2% 12.3% 12.2% 12.1% 
Durbin-Watson 1.97 2.01 1.97 1.95 1.95 1.96 1.97 1.97 1.97 
*significant at .10, **significant at .05, ***significant at .01. 
 
Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash equivalents to book assets.  LEV is the leverage variable as measured by the ratio of total debt to 
total book assets.  RISK is the absolute change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation.  M/B is the market to book ratio, as 
defined by Opler, et. al (1999).  This ratio is calculated as the book value of assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity, divided by book assets.  SIZE is the natural log of total book assets.  EQUITY-ISS is net equity issuance which is 
equity sale minus equity purchases, divided by book assets.  DEBT-ISS is the net debt issuance which is long-term debt issuance 
minus long-term debt retirement divided by book assets.  CAPEX is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets.  
ACQ is cash outflow due to the acquisition divided by total book assets.  DIV is the amount of common dividends paid. 
8
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The univariate model for the full sample indicates that the firm size is significant and negative, 
indicating that larger firms have lower cash holdings.  This is not a surprising result in that our expectation 
was indeterminate given the evidence in the existing literature.  It should also be noted that the size 
coefficient is significant and negative in all regression models. 
 
The next significant variable is leverage.  The coefficient here is significant and positive.  This is the 
opposite of our a priori expectation and contradicts the findings of Luo and Hachiya (2005).  However, it 
may be the case in that shareholders recognize the need to constrain managers who have access to 
significant cash holdings in an attempt to prevent “empire building” as discussed by Jensen (1986).  
Shareholders may take on more debt so that interest payments serve to monitor the actions of managers. 
 
Model 3 includes the previously mentioned variables as well as the capital expenditures variable.  
The coefficient is significant and negative as we expected.  This finding tends to support the notion that 
casino firms with small cash holdings make more capital expenditures.  This finding tends to support the 
pecking order theory of financing by Myers (1977).  Firms may have a preference for using cash and cash 
equivalents to expand with capital budgeting projects. 
 
Model 4 adds a net debt issuance variable.  The coefficient is significant and positive as expected.  
Casino firms that issue take on a greater amount of debt (more than they pay off) tend to hold more cash.  
Model 5 adds an acquisition variable and the coefficient is significant and negative as expected.  Firms that 
make acquisitions appear to tend to spend more of their cash.   
 
We next added a market to book ratio variable and a net equity issue variable to models 6 and 7, 
respectively.  However, neither variable had coefficients of any significance.  However, Model 7 does have 
the highest adjusted r-squared values of any of the 9 regression models.  A dividend payment variable and a 
risk variable were added to models 8 and 9, respectively.  Neither of these variable coefficients was 
significant nor did they add explanatory power to the models.  Thus, considering the lack of significance of 
the risk variable for the full sample, there is no statistical evidence supporting our research hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between cash holdings and firm risk. 
 
Conclusions and implications for future research 
 
The purpose of this research was to assess the relationship between the cash holding policy of casino 
firms and two primary variables:  firm risk and firm leverage.  We found no support for the full sample 
such that risky firms hold more cash.  A potential research topic would be to try using different proxies for 
risk and see if they produce different results. 
 
In terms of the relationship between cash holding policy and firm leverage, we find a significant and 
positiverelationship between the two for the full sample.   This is the opposite of our expectations and 
different from the findings of researchers such as Opleret. al. (1999) and Luo and Hachiya (2005).  Thus, it 
appears that casino firms are borrowing more debt and holding on to it.  Thus, these actions may support 
the pecking-order theory in that casino firms are using internal funds (presumably generated from the sale 
of goods and services) to finance growth opportunities.  However, a fundamental question remains:  why 
borrow money in the first place?  This is a potential future research topic. 
 
The previous result may be either impacted by the years analyzed (1990 to 2007) or else the lack of 
homogeneity of the sample.  Although we utilized SIC Code 7990 in our data analysis, an examination of 
the companies retrieved from the database indicates a wide range of company types.  When one thinks of 
the casino industry, one usually thinks of well-known casino hotel companies such as MGM-Mirage or 
Wynn.  However, the full sample includes many other “non-traditional” casino and gaming-related firms 
9
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that could be confounding the results.  It may be fruitful for future researchers to logically categorize this 
variety of firms into more homogeneous groups and re-examine the cash holding policy once again. 
 
This study used casino data from 1990 to 2007.  Since casino revenues dramatically fluctuated 
depending on economic situation (recession vs. boom), it would be worthwhile to analyze different time 
periods.  While some firms pay dividends, others do not pay dividends.  The sample could be categorized 
by dividend paying firms and non-dividend paying firms. 
 
Finally, we focused primarily on casino firms with SIC Code 7990.  It may be worthwhile to 
examine the cash holding policy of other segments of the hospitality industry such as lodging or restaurants 
and see if the results reported herein are supported or refuted.    
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